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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
; ,,f ! CONSTRUCTION 
'"cl ilhl(']T()RD INSURANCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. 19006 
DWINN A. HENION, of 
BARI LYN BLAIR, daughter of 
RAFFY A. BLAIR, deceased, and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
l'TAH, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
A petition was filed by Blake Stevens Construction Company 
ond Hartford Insurance Company, defendants below, for a review of 
the finding of the Industrial Commission of the average weekly 
uf Barry A. Blair who died as a result of an accident in the 
cr,urse of his employment for Blake Stevens Construction Company. 
DISPOSITION !lY TEE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
After a hearing on the denial by the plaintiffs of 
l1ahtl1t/ for death benefits to the afterborn daughter of the 
-,Sf'd, ,\dministrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen found that the 
,J,>11t 's ,1ve>raqe weekly wage at the time of his death was 
in l''"r h'C'ek c'nd that his dciughter was entitled to benefits 
based upon those earnings. 
contesting the inclusion in the calcuCJtion or the <1ecf',1se<1' 
average weekly wage of amounts paid tu him fur living 
The Industrial Commission affirmed ,Judge 1\llen's finding in J 
unanimous decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant requests that the court affirm the 
Industrial Commission's order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant accepts as accurate the plaintiffs' 
summary of the facts with the additional statement that the 
evidence upon which the Commission based its findings both as 
to the paternity of the minor applicant and the earnings of the 
deceased was uncontracted in every respect. (R27-47). 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS AUTH-
ORIZED BY LAW TO INCLUDE PAYMENTS TO 
A WORKER FOR LIVING EXPENSES IN ITS 
CALCULATION 01 HIS AVERJ\GF: \·iEEKLY \'JAGE. 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing acts of the Industrial 
Commission, is limited to a determinCJtion of whether the Cornrn1s' 
has exceeded its powers or disregarded some positive prov1s1on 
law in making or denying an award. 
Industrial Commission, G6 Ut:ih 173, 240 Pcic. 44C 1192'i!. 
The issue raised h\' this petiti<•n is \·!hethor the IncL:c' 
Commission was authc;r17cd tn consider evidenc(' r;f tn 
the deceased by his l i':i ng 
-:::-
: " 1'"·rd for his hourly wage in making its finding of his 
'' 1• weekly wage" within the meaning of the Compensation Act. 
;;ection 35-1-75 Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Volume 4B 
1 if' l I •wket Supplement) provides the basis for computing a 
workct 's average weekly wage which, in turn, determines the rate 
dt which workmen's compensation benefits are payable to his 
dependents in the event of his death by industrial accident. 
)5-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of 
computation. (1) Except as otherwise 
provided in this act, the average weekly 
wage of the injured employee at the time 
of the injury shall be taken as the basis 
upon which to compute the weekly compensation 
rate and shall be determined as follows: 
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages 
are fixed by the year, the average weekly 
wage shall be that yearly wage divided by 
52. 
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages 
are fixed by the month, the average weekly 
wage shall be that monthly wage divided by 
4 1/3. 
(c) If at the time of the injury the wages 
are fixed by the week, that amount shall be 
the average weekly wage. 
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages 
are fixed by the date, the weekly wage shall 
be determined by multiplying the daily wage 
by the number of days and fraction of days 
in the week durinq which the employee under 
a contract of was working at the time 
of the accident, or would have worked if the 
accident had not intervened. In no case shall 
the daily wage be multiplied by less than three 
for the purpose of determining the weekly wage. 
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the average weekly wage shall 
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate 
-3-
by the number of hours the 
would have worked for the week if lhe 
accident had not intervened. In no-
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied 
by less than 20 for the purpose of 
determining the weekly wage. 
(f) If at the tirne of the injury the 
hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot 
be ascertained, the wage for the purpose 
of calculating compensation shall be the 
usual wage for similar services where those 
services are rendered by paid employees. 
(g) (l) If at the time of the injury the 
wages are fixed by the output of the employee, 
the average weekly wage shall be the wage 
most favorable to the employee computed 
by dividing by thirteen the wages, not 
including overtime or premium pay, of the 
employee earned through that employer in the 
first, second, third, or fourth period of 
thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the 
52 weeks immediately preceding the injury. 
(2) If the employee has been employed by 
that employer less than thirteen calendar 
weeks immediately preceding the injury, his 
average weekly wage shall be computed as under 
subsection (1) (g) (1), presuming the wages, 
not including overtime or premium pay, to be 
the amount he would have earned had he been so 
employed for the full thirteen calendar weeks 
immediately preceding the injury and had 
worked, when work was available to other 
employees, in a similar occupation. 
(3) If none of the methods in subsection 
(1) will fairly determine the average weekly 
wage in a particular case, the commission shall 
use such other method as will, based on the 
facts presented, fairly determine the employee's 
average weekly wage. 
(4) "'lhen the average weekly waqe of the injur 
employee at the time of the in Jury is deter;cineci 
as in this section provided, it shall be taken 
as the basis upon which to compute the weeklJ 
compensation rate. After tho weekly cornrensat10 
has been cornpu ted, it shu 11 be round0c1 tc' the 
nearest dollar. 
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Court has recently construed Section 75 of the 
11 '"" Act with particular reference to the authority 
n 1 • 1 1 cd upon the Commission by subsection ( 3). In Craig 
l:u1nlidm Produce v. Industrial Commission, Utah Sup.Ct. No. 17968 
1.13nuary 24, 1983) the employer sought reversal of an award 
by the Commission which was based upon a calculation of his 
Pmrloyee's average weekly wage which included his earnings from 
a separate part-time job. The plaintiffs argued that Section 75 
of the act conferred no express authority upon the Comrnission 
to combine earnings from two employers and that the Comrnission 
was therefore limited in its authority to multiplying the employee's 
hourly wage in his employment at the moment of injury by the 
number of hours he worked on that job in accordance with subsection 
le). 
This Court rejected the employer's narrow construction 
ot the Industrial Commission's statutory authority. Justice Hall ex-
i laim·•! th:it the Legislature intended by subsection (3) to give 
the Commission broad authority to use "methods over and above 
those specified in subsection (1) as will permit it to fairly 
.1etccrmine the injured employee's weekly wage". Burnham v. Industrial 
<:onun1 ssion, supra. The Court's analysis of the question in Burnham 
suqyosts that the Industrial Commission's determination of what 
•s •.1ir will not be disturbed unless its method of computation 
1 •r1trc1r·: to the express provisions of the statute or unless 
· ,_,slllt is incompatible with the underlying purpose of the 
1 h11cn' s C'nmpensa ti on /\ct. 
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A. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINc; 
IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH ANY 
SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE COMP-
ENSATION ACT. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Commission's considerat 1 
of subsistence payments in making its average weekly wage find in 
is inconsistent with Utah law because a specific provision 
such payments to be regarded as wages which is part of a model 
compensation act is not found in the Utah act and because the 
definition of the word "wages" in the Wage Claim Act, Utah Code 
Anno. Sec. 34-28-2(2) (Replacement Volume 4B 1974), et seq. does 
not expressly include payments for living expenses. 
A related argument was made by the employer in Burnham 
v. Industrial Commission, supra, as noted, and was rejected 
by this Court. Unless there is an express prohibition on the 
manner of calculation employed, the question is simply whether 
the Commission could lawfully employ such a method under sub-
section (3). 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative histor 
of Section 75 which remotly implies, as plaintiffs suggest, that 
the Utah Legislature intended to exclude living expenses from 
the statutory definition of wages in the Compensation Act. The 
plaintiffs state that Section 75 of the Utah act is "modeled 
after" Section 19 of the proposed "Workmen's Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Law" drafted by the Council on State Governments. 
That provision is set forth along with the Section 75 in Appenc 
"A". However, a comparison of the two rc\'e<J.ls more differences 
-()-
c_,11111 lar1tiese 
first, it is obvious that the model act provides 
, , ,,. /1 '"'"e detailed scheme for calculating the average weekly 
thdn does the Utah statute with specific provisions applic-
Jhle to minors, apprentices, volunteer firemen, seasonal workers 
and persons with dual employment. Secondly, it contains no pro-
vision comparable to Section 75(3) vesting authority in the 
Commission to use wage calculation methods which are not specifically 
enumerated. 
Furthermore, the wage definition which plaintiffs contend 
rrnr Legislature deliberately omitted from the Utah act is not 
found 1n Section 19 of the model act but is one of twenty-five 
definitions in Section 2 of the suggested legislation. The 
definition section of the Utah Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 35-1-44, (Replacement Volume 4B, 1974), contains only eight 
,;efini tions and bears no relationship to the model act. Signifi-
cantly, the Utah act at Section 44(8) defines "average weekly 
simply as "the average weekly earnings arrived at by 
the rules provided in Section 35-1-75". 
If any conclusion about the Legislature's intention is 
i11st1fier1 by a comparison of the two acts, it is that our Legis-
l•Lure disavowed any attempt to address all the situations in which 
U1E' vagc determination might involve peculiar considerations in 
"' 1 "' d L>roacJ grant of discretion to the Industrial Commission 
irr11d<1te calculation methods consistent with the purpose of 
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It is also noteworthy that the model act in 1. 
contains a specific provision requiring that wages from 
be combined which is, of course, absent from the Utah act. Tl·, 
plaintiffs'view that the omission from the Ctah act of a 
manditory calculation provision in the model act reflects a 
legislative intent to prohibit the Commission from employing 
such a method would foreclose the result reached by this Court 
in Burnham. 
Plaintiffs next contend that the definition of the terr 
"wages" in Sec. 34-28-2 (2) Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Volume 4' 
1974) which applies to the Wage Claims Act substantiates their 
position that payments for living expenses are not wages. In 
pertinent part, that section states that 
The word "wages"means all amounts 
due the employee for labor or 
services • 
Given our Legislature's specific provision that "wages" 
in the Compensation Act are to be calculated and defined by the 
formula set out in Section 75, it seems minimally useful to 
examine definitions of the term found elsewhere in the code whic 
are expressly limited in their application to other chapters. 
The defendants submit, however, that the definition of wages rel 
on, ''amounts due for labor or services " does not 
exclude payments for living expenses. If an aareed tc 
pay an employee a specific amount li,'inq expenses in ret 
for his labor and services and then refused to do s0, th0 defer. 
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11 wst that these unpaid amounts would indeed qualify as "wages" 
'" the meaning of the Wage Claims Act and that an action to 
them would lie. 
The Industrial Commission is not prohibited from 
including living expenses in its calculation of a worker's 
average weekly wage nor is there any indication that the Legis-
lature intended that such earnings not be considered. 
B. THE INCLUSION OF LIVING EXPENSES 
IN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE CALCULATIONS IS 
A REASONABLE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
BY THE COMMISSION IN KEEPING WITH 
THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT. 
If more than one inference or conclusion can reason-
ably be drawn from the evidence, it is not the Supreme Court's 
perogative to direct which one the Commission should chose. Pace v. 
Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 6, 47 P.2d 1050 (1935). Similarly, 
when this Court is reviewing an exercise by the Commission of 
discretion committed to it by the Legislature to adopt the 
calculation method it deems fairest in a particular case, 
t!te Supreme Court is not called upon to substitute its judgment 
for that of the Commission but simply to decide whether the 
Commission abused its discretion, e.g., Probst v. Industrial 
1:ommiss1on, 588 P.2d 717 (Utah 1978). 
It is the nearly unanimous rule in other jurisdictions 
thd t payments made to an employee by his employer for living 
•1·cnsPs in the form of free room or board, or fixed amounts to 
t, 1 those costs, when they are understood by the parties 
,., nst1tute part of the consideration given for an employee's 
-9-
services, are to be included in the culculation "f l1is w,v", 
for compensation purposes, 2A Larson The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, Sec. 60.12; 82 Am Jur. 2d. 
Sec. 372. 
"Workmen's Compensat1c 
The plaintiffs correctly note that the legislatures of 
many states have expressly provided that the value of board, rent, 
housing, etc. when given to a worker by his employer are part 
of his wages, Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital v. Ansill, 390 So. 
2d. 1201 (Fla. App. 1980); Waldroupe v. Kelly, 189 Kan.99, 367 
P.2d 77(1961); H.J. Heinz Co. v. Wood, 181 Okl. 389,74 P.2d 353 
(1937); Parrish v. Industrial Commission, 15 Colo. 2d. 538, 379 
P.2d 384 (1963), but they contended that because the question 
so often been resolved legislatively, reference to the law of 
other jurisdictions does not aid the Court in this review. Howeve-
the prevalance of statutes resolving this issue in the same 
manner as did the Commission, the body which under our law 
was given the discretion to do so, actually reflects the 
reasonableness of its determination. 
Furthermore, it is the general rule in jurisdictions 
without such express provisions to include living expenses or 
the value of room and board in claulcation of average waaes. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona in Matlock v. Industna-
Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 i'.?d 612 (1950) held that the actu,1 ' 
value of housing and food provided to a ranch hand should he aJ' 
to his salary to compute is average wugc. The courts of Louisi-w 
have long held that when un employer prov id es loclci i nq nr rne<'il s i' 
-10-
"'I 1 , er or a sum to pay for them their value should be 
, 111 1lcd 0s part of his average wages. Morgan v. Equitable 
383 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 1980), Ardven 
. S••uthern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 323 (La. 
J9Gl); also, Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E. 
2d 7 (1939). 
The plaintiffs make much of the fact that the employer 
in this case paid the deceased's living expenses when he was 
required to work out of town but not when he was able to live 
at home and argue that such a case should be distinguished from 
one where an employer provides or pays for lodging or meals 
throughout the year. Assuming that it is within the Industrial 
Commission's power to include payments for living expenses in 
the average wage calculation, however, there is no basis in logic 
nor in the policy of the law for requiring it to make such a 
rli stinction. 
In states which have adopted a rule that payments for 
l i '." 1ng expenses are part of a worker's wages, those payments are 
typic0lly included even if they are only made when a person is 
''"''' from his home eating in restaurants and lodging in hotels 
i.n Cosgriff "J. Duluth Firemen's Relief Ass'n., 233 Minn. 233, 
H, .\·!. 2J 250 (1951) and American Surety of New York v. Underwood, 
\J . .>d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). The latter case involved 
',,,JI ing salesman who was reimbursed for out of pocket expenses 
''""I ,,ml hotels while on the road even though he lived at 
,1thl'rw1se. 
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Similarly, in appl'/inq ci !Jew York compensat1un stat'"'-' 
which based compensation payments on a proven diminution of 
income, a New York appellate court concluded that a travelling 
salesman who sustained an injury which prevented him from 
and obtaining subsistence payments in addition to his salary 
had suffered a wage loss even though he continued to receive hie 
salary since he would no longer have the cost of his food and 
housing borne by his employer. 
(N.Y. 3rd App.Div. 1938). 
Rowe v. Kenney, 7 NYS 2d 768 
This application of the rule makes sense. Payment of 
out of state living expenses is not simply reimbursement to a 
worker for out of pocket expenses occasioned by his job but 
constitutes an increase in his earnings during that time. Suet 
a worker spends money for food whether he is at home or out of 
town. If at home, he pays for his food out of his hourly waqe5 
When on the road, however, an additional payment is made to hirr 
with which to cover the same expense. 
It is true that the cost of a motel room miqht 
an expense incurred solely because of his job in the' rase of 
a person who continues to pay rent or to discharae a mortaage 
a house from which he is absent. However, in the aener.:il sense 1 
the cost of housinq, like the cc1st of fond, is one which, \·.Jithc 
payment of living expenses, a worker must prn\11c1e f1yr r_iut of 111 
hourl:/ wages but which with an i ti1-nal he· rr:i·: co,·er 
reduce so as to create an increase nf his carn1nqs. i\S the 'I'f:-·Y· 
-1 :'-
r·<>url observed in The American Surety Co., case, 
crr1dd, /4 s.w. 2d at 553, 
Whether an employee maintains his own 
home or not he must nevertheless have 
a place to sleep and food to eat, and 
some pecuniary advantage must ordinarily 
result to him in having these necessities 
supplied by his employer. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence in this case that 
the employer's payment of a subsistence allowance was contingent 
upon an actual outlays of money by the deceased for living 
expenses. Presumably, if he chose to sleep in a tent and bring 
his own food he would have been equally entitled to the additional 
sum as a bonus for out of town work. Additionally, the plaintiffs' 
suggestion that the subsistence payrrent was intended in part to 
1·over "travel expenses", Brief of Plaintiffs, P.6, is without 
foundation in the record. There is no evidence that the deceased 
spent money for gasoline or any other cost of transportation 
was to be reimbursed by the subsistence payment. 
In sum, there in nothing about the nature of the payment 
of living expenses to a worker who is out of town which makes 
it unreasonable to treat those payments like other extra payments 
f.or f'r ivision of living expenses in return for work. 
The plaintiffs' contention that the Commission's 
rirl1r·,1t1on of Section 75 of the Act is inconsistent with the 
I rrr "t the Workmen's Compensation Act is equally without merit. 
l'l1r purpose of the act, i_n the words of this court, is 
-13-
to substitute ci more hum,1r11L1r1:1r1 
and economico.l systf'm r.C 
for injured \vurkmen or thL'ir depenUcnt:, 
in case of de1th which the more h11marn' 
and moral conception of our time 
requires . 
Barker Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 10-1 Utcih 371, l'' 
P.2d 266, 270 (1943), and to 
alleviate hardships upon workers 
and their dependents due to 
industrial injuries. 
Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 29 r.2d 689, 
694 (1955). Again and again this court has held that the act 
should be liberally construed to afford coverage and give erfect 
its purposes. Burnham, supra, at P.15, Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. 
The plaintiffs contend that if living expenses are 
included in the calculation of wagEs upon which compensation t 0 
the dependent of the deceased employee is based, she will recei"'c· 
a "windfall". Their argument is that if the deceased were ;il1"c 
the cost of his own food and housing would consume the payment 
for living expenses and that it woulcl net represent any incrPase 
in funds available for the care of a dependent. Once he is rleac, 
it would be an unfair benefit to his surviving dependent to 
her to collect COfnfJCnSatlOn based upon rici;:mentS lntL'ncJC 1 tr 
cover those expenses. 
The suggestion t!lClt the Comr.i1ss1on 1 s d.h'dr,1 \\:,-i:-· ,1 
fall" to a child who will ne\·er see her "crth01- ico c:itl1''' "' 
In any it is the defendunt' s \'lC'W, ,-is nr)t<'•l L',11 ! 1( 1 1 lic1r 
payment for li'.'ing expensc:s is ;v1t s1r1 icir":,l1! 
, 1 c'xpenses occasioned solely by employment but is a bonus 
, 1,' t '11 food and housing which increases the total earnings 
, 1 L1blL' for other purposes including the care of dependents. 
11nrN1ver, the plaintiffs' argument could be made in any death 
case. Whenever the wage earner dies all of his "living expenses" 
are eliminated. Nevertheless, the Legislature has determined 
that !us dependents should have benefits in the amount of two-
thirds of his average weekly wages, as defined pursuant to Section 
75, up to fixed maximum without requiring any deduction from his 
wages for those expenses which will no longer be incured or direct-
ing any inquiry towards what portion of his average weekly wage the 
deceased actually had available for the care of his dependents 
during his life. 
The purpose of the act is effectuated when it is 
liberally construed to afford coverage and to reduce the economic 
consequences to his family of a worker's death by industrial 
lr:cldent. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than attempting to anticipate the many factual 
which might arise in calculating a worker's average 
wcckl· wage, our Legislature in Section 75 set forth several basic 
1cal formulas which would resolve the issue in most cases 
,1,, ttll'n •Jave the Industrial Commission authority to use any other 
which would more fairly resolve the issue. By deciding 
10 wcnts to an employee for living expenses should be 
,n:, 1, :\-. 1 C'ci , 1 ] <Jnq \Vl th his hour l _j ,,,ages in determining his average 
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weekly wage, the Commission has reached the same result Jc, 1 , 
every court and legislature which has aclclressecl the issuC'. 1 v 
consideration of those earnings in this case is a reasonaLile 
exercise of its discretion and is consistent with the humanitar,· 
purpose of the act and the liberal construction this Court has 
always given it. 
This Court's jurisdiction on review is limited. WherE 
substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings and it 
has not abused the discretion conferred upon it by law, the 
Commission's order should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of May, 1983. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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l\PPENDIX "A" 
w0rkTnen's Compensation 
:in,TRel1'1bi 1 i ta tion 
- Section 19 -----
Section 1 9. ( Determination 
,if Aver3qe Weekly Wage) . 
Except as otherwise provided 
in this act, the average 
weekly wage of the injured 
employee at the time of the 
rniury shall be taken as 
the basis upon which to 
compute compensation and 
shall be determined as 
'ollows: 
(a) If at the time of the 
iniury the wages are fixed 
by the week the average 
,;eekly wage should be that 
emount; 
!bl If at the time of 
the injury the wages are 
fixed by the month, the 
J1·erage weekly wage shall 
Ge the monthly wage so 
fi,ed multi plied by 12 
olhi divided by 52; 
1c) T f at the time of 
the in j ur ,. the wages are 
'ixed by the year, the 
J\'er.Joe ,,veekly wage shall be 
10,, ;earl waqe so fixed 
;, ' ic'le<I 5 2; 
I) I I) If cJt the time 
i 111111 "' the waqes 
'•' IY,.' the day, hour 
t lie· ·1 utput of the 
t', the overage weekly 
slic1!J be the wage most 
t«L:" tll the employee 
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Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-75 (Replacement 
Vol.4B, 1981 Pocket Supplement) 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage-
Basis of computation. (1) 
Except as otherwise provided 
in this act, the average weekly 
wage of the injured employee 
at the time of the injury shall 
be taken as the basis upon 
which to compute the weekly 
compensation rate and shall 
be determined as follows: 
(a) If at the time of the 
injury the wages are fixed by 
the year, the average weekly 
wage shall be that yearly wage 
divided by 52. 
(b) If at the time of the 
injury the wages are fixed by 
the month, the average weekly 
wage shall be that monthly wage 
divided by 4 1/3. 
(c) If at the time of the 
injury the wages are fixed by 
the week, that amount shall be 
the average weekly wage. 
(d) If at the time of the 
injury the wages are fixed 
by the date, the weekly wage 
shall be determined by multi-
plying the daily wage by the 
number of days and fraction of 
days in the week during which 
the employee under a contract 
of hire was working at the 
time of the accident, or would 
have worked if the accident 
had not intervened. In no case 
computed by dividing by 
13 the wages (not ihcluding 
overtime or premium pay) of 
said employee earned in the 
employ of the employer in 
the first, second, third, or 
fourth period of 13 consecu-
tive calendar weeks in the 
52 weeks immediately pre-
ceeding the injury. 
(2) If the employee has 
been in the employ of the 
employer less than 13 calen-
dar weeks immediately pre-
ceeding the injury, his 
average weekly wage shall 
be computed under the fore-
going paragraph, taking the 
wages (not including over-
time or premium pay) for 
such purposes to be the amount 
he would have earned had he 
been so employed by the em-
ployer the full 13 calandar 
weeks immediately preceeding 
the injury and had worked, 
when work was available to 
other employees in a similar 
occupation. 
(e) If at the time of the 
injury the hourly wage has not 
been fixed or can not be assert-
ained, the wage for the purpose 
of calculating compensation 
shall be taken to be the usual 
wage for similar services 
where such services are 
rendered by paid employees. 
( f) In occupations which 
are exclusively seasonal and 
therefore cannot be carried 
on throughout the year, the 
average weekly wage shall be 
taken to be one-fiftieth of 
the total wages which the 
employee has earned from all 
occupations during the 12 
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shall the daily waqp 
multiplied by less thcll, ,, 
for the purpose of dete: ,., 1 
the weekly wage. 
(e) If at the time of 11,. 
injury the wages are fixec 
the hour, the average week:. 
wage shall be determined 
multi plying the hourly 
by the number of hours the 
employee would have worked : 
the week if the accident 
not intervened. In no case 
shall the hourly wage be 
multiplied by less than 20 
the purpose of · 
weekly wage. 
(f) If at the time of tb• 
injury the hour 1 y wage has · 
been fixed or cannot be as-
certained, the wage for 
purpose of calculating comf-
ensation shall be the usual 
wage for similar services 
where those services are re:· 
dered by paid employees. 
( g) ( 1) If at the time or 
the injury the wages are fr.. 
by the output of the emploYt 
the average weekly wage sha: 
be the wage most favorable 
the employee computed by c: 
ing by thirteen the wages, 
including overtime or 
pay, of the employee earne: 
through that employer in 
first, second, third, or 
fourth period of thirteen 
consecutive calendar weeks 
the 52 weeks immediate!/ 
preceeding the inJurv. 
(2) If the employee 
employed by that 
than thirteen calendar tlC• 
immediately prececlinq the 
his average wet'kly wage er 
'II t hs ironedia tely 
1111<1 the injury. 
('JJ !11 the case of volunteer 
111 emenr police, and civil 
Jcfensc members or trainees, 
the income benefits shall 
be based on the average 
weekly wage in their regular 
employment. 
lh) If the employee was a 
apprentice or trainee 
when injured, and it is 
established that under normal 
conditions his wages should 
be expected to inc reage 
durin1 the period of cis-
at, lity, that fact may be 
considered in computing his 
average wec:-_ly wage. 
( i ) Wh2 n the employee 
.!.S v.od.i 10 
co,1lracts -,-1i th two u:r m0re 
e.r1ployers and the defendant 
employ"'r :ids knowledge of 
c•Jch crr,to.Loyment prior to the 
injury, hj s waJcs from 3ll 
such emelover s shal J be con-
:iidered as if earn'2G ...:rorn 
the l L3..blE COm;::--
e11Sat 
be computed as under sut-
section (1) (g) (1), presumiw 
the wages, not including 
overtime or premium pay, to 
the amount he would have ear__oed 
had he been so employed 
the full thirteen calendar 
weeks immediately preceding 
the injury and had worke.i. wh=,!' 
work was available to other 
employees, in a similar cc-
cupation. 
( 3) If Pone of the methoc"' 
in subsection (1) will fair:: 
the average week:y 
wage in a particular case, 
commission s.1all use such ot-".e "." 
method as will, based on the 
facts presented, fairly 
mine tne average 
Wl"eklv wage 
1 wr,er_ c..ve:raqe 
wase of the it1ju.._ed 
the of the injury iE 
detecmined as in this 
provided, it shall be taken 
the basis upo1·, w:iicl1 to cc.mp'_· _e; 
ti1e weekly compansation rate. 
:\fter tre cc•mpcnsc tior 
has been compJted, it shall 
rounded tc. 
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